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SHADES OF YESTERYEAR: IS THE MIDDLE EAST
ON THE PATH TO REGIONAL WAR?
Nathan W. Toronto
Abstract
Is the Middle East on a path to regional war? One hundred years
after the conclusion of World War I, many of the same factors the
preceded wars in Europe seem to be in place in the region today:
increased arms sales, social and political unrest, and increasing
conscription. This paper examines the similarities and differences
between the Middle East today and the Europe of 1914. It also
analyzes key variables to develop scenarios that could lead to peace
or war in the region.
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The Middle East today is at its most turbulent since the
1990–91 Kuwait Crisis. The region is in such upheaval that it
hearkens back to the period before World War I, when turmoil in
Europe erupted into a cataclysm of industrialized warfare
involving mass armies and widespread destruction. The Middle
East today is not at that stage, but under what conditions could
such a nightmare play out in the region?
Shades of Yesteryear
It is worth mentioning the similarities that today’s Middle
East bears to the Europe of 1914. In the years leading up to 1914,
European countries engaged in a substantial arms race, marked
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especially by the great naval race between Germany and the United
Kingdom. In the last ten years, military spending has increased
dramatically in the Middle East, due in part to Iraq rebuilding its
military after the US withdrawal, and then fighting da’esh (ISIS),
but also to an increase in spending in the Gulf (SIPRI, 2016).
Europe before 1914 was also a region of social and political
unrest, with separatist movements and challenges to the social
order across the region, from open rebellion in Russia and the
Balkans to widespread labor unrest in Western Europe. It goes
without saying that similar patterns have emerged in the last ten
years in the Middle East, with the American occupations of Iraq
and Afghanistan; the unrest of the Arab Spring; a standoff between
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE; and
ongoing violent clashes from Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt to Yemen,
Iraq, and Syria. These conflicts, thankfully, have so far not merged
into a single regional conflict, but the trends are worrisome, with
pervasive sectarianism, a rekindling of tensions between Europe
and Russia, between Iran and its Arab neighbors across the Gulf,
and between Israelis and Palestinians.
Another telling similarity between Europe in 1914 and the
Middle East today is the use of universal male conscription in
Egypt, Syria, Iran, and the UAE and an increase in ideological
sentiment throughout the region. Taken separately, these two
trends are fairly innocuous. Powerful nationalist sentiment can
promote loyalty and cohesion in society, but blind loyalty, coupled
with the means to send hundreds of thousands of men into battle,
contributed to the shock of World War I in Europe. It also
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contributed to the tension of the Cold War, when millions of
soldiers, many of them conscripted, faced off across the plains of
Central Europe. Groups like da’esh employed blind-faith ideology
to mobilize thousands to their cause, and ongoing efforts to
reassert government control over media and information in the
Middle East, after initially losing ground at the beginning of the
information age, has the potential to give states a similar
mobilizing power. None of Europe’s leaders in 1914 expected the
catastrophe that ensued, but once the battle was joined they could
not easily back down, nor could they keep from putting more and
more men under arms, demonizing the enemy and whipping up
popular anger to mobilize support for war. A regional conflict on
that scale has not broken out in the Middle East yet, but the
conditions exist that make it possible: reinvigorated arms races
after the so called American pivot to Asia, widespread social
tension, and conscription with ideological fervor.
Some Differences
But there are also important dissimilarities between the
Middle East today and Europe in 1914. In particular, players
outside the region, like the United States, Europe, and Russia have
tried to limit their investment in the outcome of conflicts in the
Middle East. In general, they have not committed the level of
resources that would make the outcome of any sub-regional
conflict, such as those in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, a foregone
conclusion. This resistance to being pulled in fully to these
conflicts gives external players the flexibility to play a balancing or
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stabilizing role, something that Europe in 1914 did not enjoy.
Then, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and China and Japan
were too far away to influence the outcome of events in Europe.
Perhaps the Middle East today will avoid the fate of Europe in 1914
because the United States, Europe, and Russia still have the
opportunity to exert a peaceful influence on the players involved.
Like these external players, none of the states in the Middle
East seems ready to attempt a rewrite of the regional map, as
Germany seemed prepared to do a hundred years ago. Even calls
for the break-up of Iraq seem to have subsided, especially since
the da’esh pariah openly ignored borders. Most states in the region
today are trying to restore international borders, not undermine
them. One wild card is the Kurds, a nationalist movement that
spans four states and that is not regarded as a pariah, at least not
by the US. If the Kurds overcome disagreements among the
different elements of the movement, and make a claim to statehood
that is not roundly condemned, especially by the US, then the
regional map would be threatened. Another wild card is Yemen,
where political breakup into two Yemens is once again a real
possibility.
Perhaps the most important difference between the Middle
East today and Europe in 1914, however, is the alliance structure.
Prior to World War I, mutual defense agreements, both secret and
public, essentially dictated who would be on which side of any
large-scale conflict. Most European countries chose a side. So far,
this is only partially true in the Middle East. Sunni Arab states
appear firmly committed to stopping the rise of Iranian influence
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in the region, and many states are fighting to contain, and
hopefully eliminate, da’esh, but the network of alliances is
bewilderingly unclear beyond that. Israel and Turkey have focused
on defending their perceived interests on their own, and the lack
of coherence in the Kurdish nationalist movement keeps other
countries from having to choose clear winners and losers. This
proliferation of frenemies might actually contribute to avoiding a
regional cataclysm.
Some Forecasts
What might transform the bevy of small-scale military
stalemates that characterize Middle East security today into a full-
blown regional war on the scale of, heaven forbid, World War I?
Conditions like persistent arms races, widespread social tension,
and conscription with ideological fervor seem to cast a shadow of
1914 over the Middle East, but external players can still exercise
a stabilizing influence, regional states have so far avoided
redrawing the map, and alliance patterns are unclear. If things
continue as they are, then a multiplicity of small-scale conflicts,
with ambiguous outcomes, could be the shape of things to come,
at least in the near-term. While this would hardly be a happy state
of affairs, it would certainly be preferable to a region-wide war.
Perhaps understanding how security in the Middle East
could worsen would help us understand how it could improve. As
a heuristic device for illustrating possible futures, I use scenario
planning techniques outlined by Peter Schwartz (1996) in The Art
of the Long View. Schwartz’ method uses two critical variables to
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identify scenarios that could unfold (see figure 1). Given the
analysis above, two variables seem likely to have a
disproportionate impact on future security of the Middle East:
territoriality and political dualism. Territoriality refers to the
stakes attached to territory in Middle East conflicts. So far, with
the exception of the conflict in Syria, controlling territory has
generally been of tactical, not strategic, significance in the post-
Arab Spring conflicts. In Yemen, fighting centers on how much
influence Iran has in the country; gaining a few more square
kilometers of territory would be less significant for the Saudi-led
coalition than agreeing to a deal that kept Iranian influence off the
peninsula. If the Kurds make a play for statehood, or if a state in
the region tries to annex the territory of another state, then it
would dramatically raise the implications of territoriality and
change the dynamic of security in the region, possibly precipitating
a regional war.
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The second variable, political dualism, refers to the extent
that players inside and outside the region view security questions
in black-and-white, good-and-evil terms. This with-us-or-against-
us approach to political discourse reduces debate to a question of
loyalty and limits policy options, with a concomitant increase in
the stakes of failure. So far, some trends point in a dualistic
direction, while others point in a pluralistic one. In Libya, two sides
are engaged in a rancorous military stalemate, but they are still
negotiating in fits and starts. The conflict in Yemen is often cast in
dualistic terms, but a non-military solution appears possible. Still,
leaders in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey have painted most opposition
with a broad brush of terrorism, which could have the unintended
effect of making failure more costly to political leaders, not less.
Figure 1 outlines how these variables could determine what
the future holds for the Middle East. In the most frightening
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scenario, “War Is Hell”, a series of ongoing sub-regional wars
morphs into one consolidated, regional war, with two clear sides
and extremely high stakes, as occurred in Europe a hundred years
ago. This scenario would result if political discourse increasingly
casts security challenges in good-versus-evil terms (political
dualism high) and if territory itself acquires strategic stakes
(territoriality high). In this scenario, political leaders would
mobilize all the resources of society to defeat the enemy, and
lifetimes’ worth of blood and treasure would spill onto the
battlefield, probably over the future of Yemen, Syria, and
Kurdistan.
Two somewhat less frightening scenarios are “Road to
Martyrs’ Square” and “Messy Break-up”. “Road to Martyrs’ Square”
refers to the excellent book by Anne Marie Oliver and Paul F.
Steinberg (2006), Road to Martyrs’ Square: A Journey into the World
of the Suicide Bomber. This scenario would result if territoriality
reduces in importance, for example, if Da’esh territorial control is
eliminated and no other player makes a bid to claim territory
(territoriality low). In “Road to Martyrs’ Square”, political dualism
becomes more salient, with conflicts increasingly cast in good-
versus-evil terms. In this scenario, suicide terrorism would
increase in frequency and, possibly, scale, not only in Europe but
in the Middle East as well, as terrorist organizations try to replicate
and outdo the notoriety gained by Da’esh. Increasing political
dualism will do nothing to eradicate the idea of radical violent
extremism.
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In the “Messy Break-up” scenario, political discourse
becomes more pluralistic (dualism low) and territoriality increases
in importance, possibly as a result of a claim to Kurdish statehood
or the fracturing of Yemen, or both. This scenario would entail
violence, but not on the scale of “War Is Hell” or with the terrifying
randomness of “Road to Martyrs’ Square”. In this scenario, players
external to the regional might negotiate a stable territorial solution
while regional players not directly involved focus on security and
building political institutions at home. Alternatively, external
players may be unable to negotiate or guarantee a reasonable
territorial solution, but the conflict would essentially be contained.
In this scenario, radical extremism might have less of a draw
because governments in the Middle East would provide
populations with outlets for peaceful dissent and allow the
creation of civil society institutions.
In the final scenario, “Getting to Europe”, political leaders
will have made security discourse pluralistic and maintained the
stability of internationally-recognized borders. The “Europe” that
the Middle East gets to, in this case, is not the Europe of 2015,
awash in refugees and haunted by suicide terrorism, but the
Europe of 1995, riding the wave of the post-Cold War peace
dividend and regional integration. In this scenario, the Kurds do
not get a state, but they might garner significant levels of peaceful
autonomy, while the Yemen war would end peacefully and
Palestinians and Israelis might integrate into one state where all
have equal citizenship rights. Perhaps most importantly, this is the
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only scenario that looks somewhat better than the current reality
in the region.
Final Observations
If “Getting to Europe” seems far-fetched, then we should
hope it is at least as far-fetched as “War Is Hell”. The Middle East
has surprised us in the past, in both positive and negative ways,
so it behooves us to consider the conditions under which security
in the region could get better or worse. It seems unlikely that the
current state of affairs can continue indefinitely. Something has to
give. The question is whether leaders in the region can navigate
the storms of territoriality and political dualism. One worries that
the Middle East will have to go to hell before getting to Europe.
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